Many people think that immigrants use too much of the public system. The latest research, reviewed by independent researchers, looked at more than ten years of data from all EU countries. This research tested this assumption.
The net fiscal position shows the difference between the welfare benefits received by each resident and the taxes and contributions paid. This applies to both native-born residents and migrants.
A positive number means the state pays out more than it gets back. A negative number means the opposite.
From 2007 to 2018, native-born citizens had the highest net fiscal cost to public budgets on average across all EU countries.
Both EU migrants (€469) and extra-EU migrants (€493) take three times less from public budgets per year than native-born citizens.
This difference of about €1000 between the native population and migrants can be seen in the TransEuroWorkS data, and recent research, independently reviewed (Boffi et al., 2025), confirms this across 15 EU countries. Even when we consider age and other demographics, the pattern stays the same. The research shows that problems in the labor market, like lower wages and discrimination in hiring, are what hold extra-EU migrants back, not any reliance on welfare.
Studies using 100% administrative register data of entire resident populations support this finding. Martinsen & Pons Rotger (2017) looked at all the records of the total population in Denmark, where they did not agree with the idea that EU migrants are a "welfare burden." They showed that EU migrants are actually a positive contribution to the country's finances.
Even though the facts show that immigrants are a net contributor to the economy, public opinion about immigration is different. The latest Standard Eurobarometer 105 (Spring 2026) shows that fewer Europeans are worried about immigration than last year but can be attributed to shifting attention to other topics like rising cost of living and global security.
The latest Standard Eurobarometer 105 (Spring 2026) shows that in Austria, 14% of people are worried, the same as in Germany (14%) and Ireland (14%). Even in the UK, only 24% name immigration as a top concern. People are less concerned about this because other issues are more important, like the cost of living. The Eurobarometer survey only lets people choose two top worries. Anxiety about the cost of living and global security has pushed immigration down the list. It's a change in focus, not a change in the impact of migration.
The public is more concerned about the budget than the actual budget. This shows that the public is not paying attention to the facts.
The chart makes it clear that even in countries where migrants contribute a lot to the state budget, a significant portion of public still perceives migrants as a major concern, demonstrating a disconnect between reality and how migrants are perceived.
To understand the net fiscal position, you have to look at both sides. This means you have to consider how much each group contributes in taxes and how much they receive in benefits.
Native-born citizens have the highest net cost because of an aging population and high pension costs. This is not because migrants overuse the welfare system.
According to the TransEuroWorkS cash-only data:
Independent research (Fiorio et al., 2024) confirms this gap across the EU-14. They show that when including health, education, and VAT, the average immigrant contributes +€1,510/year, compared to just +€32/year for native-born citizens.
This difference in favor of migrants is true for almost all income groups, mostly because migrants are younger and use fewer benefits like pensions due to old age.
The EU average is a good starting point, but every country has its own welfare system, demographics, and labor market. A peer-reviewed study by the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) co-authored by Christl et al. (2022) estimated a wider contribution to the government that includes benefits like education and healthcare, not just cash transfers and direct taxes. The study looked at all EU countries and grouped them into five categories based on how much welfare the country provides.
EU-wide, the latest figures (2022) put native-born citizens as the biggest net cost, about €476 per person per year, while both migrant groups cost less: €208 for EU migrants and €219 for non-EU migrants.
The researchers created a general financial model that considers not only money, but also the value of public services people use.
Because this version includes VAT and the value of public services, it's not comparable to the cash-only figures from Boffi et al. in Section 1.
But that average hides huge variation by welfare model. In the Mediterranean countries, EU migrants are enormous net contributors, over €2,600/year.
Hover over a country pill below to instantly change the simulator to its welfare regime, or use the dropdown menu on the right:
Interactive Policy Simulator: What actually makes a difference? Boffi et al. (2025) broke down the difference in financial resources between migrants and natives. We can create a model to simulate how recognizing vocational and secondary qualifications, recognizing qualifitcations, and removing integration/discrimination barriers for extra-EU migrants would have an impact. Adjust the sliders below to see the changes.
The average for each person can hide a lot of information. Instead, look at the actual totals. In Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, EU migrants paid more in taxes than they received in benefits every year of the studied period (from 2007 for Austria and Germany, and 2009 for the Netherlands and the UK, through 2013).
EU migrants are, on average, younger than the native population. This has led to concerns that the surplus is like an unpaid future pension bill. If we remove the spending on pensions (the dashed line), we can see that the extra money mostly stays in the economy. Only the Netherlands dips below zero.
Why are these numbers estimates? The study shows that national government databases do not track the nationality or citizenship of people who pay taxes or receive welfare benefits. The authors had to create expert economic models using LFS and census microdata, making conservative assumptions (like equal health access).
Hover over any point on the chart to see and compare values from all four countries.
Across all four countries, a clear pattern emerges where the share of benefits EU migrants claim is only about half their share of the population.
This pattern of population to welfare share is always the same, which goes against the idea that the welfare state is a magnet for people.
This idea is also supported by a thorough review of real-world data on immigration and welfare systems. The review, by Allen et al. (2025) in the Oxford Review of Economic Policy, found no solid proof that welfare programs attract migrants. It also confirmed that immigrants aged 18 to 65 help carry the financial challenges of an aging population.
Why do migrants use public services and benefits so little? Because of their demographic profile:
When they arrive as young, educated adults, they start paying taxes right away. This means the state where they live never paid for their schooling, and they aren't drawing pensions yet.
These figures come from a report by a group of experts (Bogdanov, Hristova, Yotov, Bruno, Valcke & Barber, ECAS, 2014). While they are expert estimates based on data from the registry, the trend they show has been confirmed by other researchers. Boffi et al. (2025) studied how migrants' financial situation in the EU has changed from 2007 to 2018. They found that it has improved after 2011, while the financial situation of people born in the EU has not changed much. D'Albis et al. (2018) used a different methodology and reached the same conclusion.
Despite the clear evidence, some myths still circulate in the public discussion. These myths come up again and again, based on age old assumptions that turn out to be wrong.
To understand the full impact of migration, we need to look beyond general statistics and focus on specific discussions. By addressing the three most common myths, and looking at the research that proves them wrong, we can get a better understanding.
The Static Baseline: Typical lifecycle models (such as Christl et al., 2022) come to the conclusion that migrants have a net lifetime deficit. This baseline assumes that their wage levels, integration barriers, and migration status don't change over the lifetime of migrants. This static view predicts deficits by assuming that migrants will never earn more , that integration never happens and that there will be no return migration, which the authors themselves noted as a limitation.
The Dynamic Reality: The long-term impact is more complicated. When economists consider how people behave and how that affects the economy, the projected deficit gets smaller or even disappears.
The Myth: Low-wage and migrants fleeing from war or persecution use a lot of services and pay little tax, so they are a net cost to the government.
The Direct Snapshot: Typical models estimate how much low-wage earners will spend in their lifetime. For example, the UK Migration Advisory Committee (MAC, 2025) estimates that while skilled main applicants add £689,000, health and care workers contribute £54,000, and family routes result in a lifetime deficit of £109,000.
Other factors: However, traditional accounting methods often don't consider other important factors like how costs change over time, how much education costs, and how wages change over time.
The Myth: High migration means less growth for the economy, strain on infrastructure, and take jobs from natives.
Reality: Instead of taking jobs, migration helps fill jobs and leads to economic growth. The IMF (2024) predicts that migration will increase the EU's economic output by 0.5% by 2030. Between 2019 and 2023, extra-EU citizens filled 64% of new jobs in the EU. At the same time, the unemployment rate among EU citizens reached record lows. This shows that displacement is not happening.
A study by d'Albis et al. (2019) over 19 OECD countries showed that a migration shock (+1 migrant for every 1,000 people) has a positive economic effect. The GDP per capita grew by up to 0.31%, net taxes increased by 1.11%, and public spending grew by 0.47%. This resulted in a temporary improvement of +0.12% in the overall financial situation, which returned to normal after five years.
Even for refugees, the financial cost is relatively small. A 2024 EcoAustria study found that the cost of refugees in Austria is about 0.4% to 0.5% of the country's GDP. This cost decreases each year as refugees find work. Ruist's (2020) global stress test shows that even in a worst-case scenario where the EU hosted all the current refugees from Asia and Africa, the annual cost would be a manageable 0.6% of GDP.
The Austrian government spends about 12.1% of its budget on Economic Affairs. This includes corporate subsidies and infrastructure. During recent economic downturns, the state introduced corporate aid and energy subsidies that changed by over 0.5% of GDP in a single cycle. This shows that similar amounts of money are usually managed.
When the public treasury regularly manages business subsidies that fluctuate by larger margins than the cost of humanitarian integration, depicting the refugees as a threat to the country's financial situation is a political debate about priorities and is not connected to academic consensus.
Research shows that the idea that immigrants are a financial burden is not true. Across the EU, natives tend to use more public money than migrants. This is mostly because of aging populations and pensions. In many welfare systems, migrants are important contributors. The data shows that EU migrants have been contributing to the budget surplus in countries with year-on-year records, even when pensions are excluded. This disproves the narratives about unpaid future pensions.
The data is clear. But it should never have been the measure. A person's value should not be based on their contributions to profit as human beings are no vessel for profit.